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Theneuromodulator dopamine has awell established role in reporting appetitive prediction errors that arewidely considered in termsof
learning.However, across awide variety of contexts, both phasic and tonic aspects of dopamine are likely to exertmore immediate effects
thathavebeen lesswell characterized.Ofparticular interest isdopamine’s influenceoneconomic risk takingandonsubjectivewell-being,
a quantity known to be substantially affected by prediction errors resulting from the outcomes of risky choices. By boosting dopamine
levels using levodopa (L-DOPA) as human subjects made economic decisions and repeatedly reported their momentary happiness, we
show here an effect on both choices and happiness. Boosting dopamine levels increased the number of risky options chosen in trials
involving potential gains but not trials involving potential losses. This effect could be better captured as increased Pavlovian approach in
an approach–avoidance decision model than as a change in risk preferences within an established prospect theory model. Boosting
dopamine also increased happiness resulting from some rewards. Our findings thus identify specific novel influences of dopamine on
decision making and emotion that are distinct from its established role in learning.
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Introduction
Decision making under risk is an important area of investigation
at the confluence of economics, psychology, and neuroscience.
Although much is known about its neural underpinnings, the pre-
cise role of at least onemajor ingredient, the neuromodulator dopa-
mine, remains unclear. Its importance is evident in the common
clinical observation that dopaminergic drugs are linked to compul-
sive gambling in Parkinson’s patients (Molina et al., 2000) and in-
creased risk taking in both humans (Norbury et al., 2013) and
animals (St Onge and Floresco, 2009; Stopper et al., 2014).
One influential explanatory framework for these findings is
the established role of dopamine in representing reinforcement
prediction errors (RPEs), which quantify the difference between
experienced and predicted appetitive outcomes (Montague et al.,
1996; Schultz et al., 1997; Bayer andGlimcher, 2005; Cohen et al.,
2012; Hart et al., 2014). Such prediction errors can exert various
effects that might relate to risk-taking behavior, including their
role as amediumof reinforcement learning (Rutledge et al., 2009;
Chowdhury et al., 2013; Piray et al., 2014). A second framework
involves dopamine’s more immediate effects on behavior (Frank
et al., 2004; Niv et al., 2007; Robbins and Everitt, 2007; Salamone
et al., 2007; Lex and Hauber, 2008; Palmiter, 2008; Sharot et al.,
2009; Pine et al., 2010; Jocham et al., 2011; Guitart-Masip et al.,
2012; Shiner et al., 2012; Norbury et al., 2013; Collins and Frank,
2014), which have been formalized through incentive salience
(Berridge and Robinson, 1998;McClure et al., 2003; Robbins and
Everitt, 2007; Salamone et al., 2007; Berridge and O’Doherty,
2013) as Pavlovian influences over appetitive choice. A third pos-
sibility is one suggested by our recent observation that RPEs in-
fluence momentary happiness via effects on task-related neural
activity in the ventral striatum, a major target for dopamine neu-
rons (Rutledge et al., 2014). This could increase the attractiveness
of taking risks, although we acknowledge that dopamine’s role in
influencing feelings of either pleasure or happiness remains a
subject of controversy (Wise et al., 1978; Drevets et al., 2001;
Salamone et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2011; Berridge andO’Doherty,
2013).
To examine dopamine’s causal influence more directly, we
administered either placebo or 150 mg of levodopa (L-DOPA) to
boost dopamine levels in 30 healthy subjects before performing
an economic decision-making task. We also periodically asked
subjects “how happy are you at this moment?” (Fig. 1A). We
compared an established parametric decision model based on
prospect theory, which operationalizes concepts of risk and loss
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aversion (Kahneman andTversky, 1979; Tversky andKahneman,
1992; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009), with an alternative decision
model that incorporates a Pavlovian approach–avoidance influ-
ence. Although subjective feelings relate to objective economic
variables, including wealth (Diener et al., 1999; Layard, 2005;
Oswald and Wu, 2010), the relationship between feelings and
rewards remains murky (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010). Experi-
ence sampling methods are widely used in well-being research to
relate subjective states to daily life events (Csikszentmihalyi and
Larson, 1987; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Adapting these
methods to the laboratory setting has allowed us to develop a
model for momentary subjective well-being (Rutledge et al.,
2014) and we employ that approach here.
Based on previous literature, we predicted that L-DOPA
would increase the number of risky options chosen (Molina et al.,
2000; Cools et al., 2003; St Onge and Floresco, 2009; Stopper et
al., 2014) and, given the relationship between prediction errors
and momentary happiness, we expected that this manipulation
would also influence its expression here. The design that we im-
plement also enabled us to test the extent to which these effects
depend on outcome valence, a pertinent question that speaks to
reported asymmetries related to dopamine (Frank et al., 2004;
Bayer andGlimcher, 2005; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Rutledge et al.,
2009; Schmidt et al., 2014).
Materials andMethods
Subjects. Thirty healthy, young adults (age  23.4  3.8 years, mean 
SD, 19 females) took part in the experiment. Subjects had a mean body
weight of 66.3 kg (range, 47–96) and a mean body mass index of 23.0
(range, 17.0–29.8). Subjects were screened to ensure no history of neu-
rological or psychiatric disorders and were not on any active medica-
tions. Subjects were endowed with £20 at the beginning of each
experimental session and paid according to overall performance after
completion of the entire study by bank transfer. The study was approved
by the Research Ethics Committee of University College London and all
subjects gave informed consent.
Study procedure. This was a within-subject double-blind placebo-
controlled study. Subjects participated on 2 occasions, typically 1 week
apart at a similar time of day, performing the same task on both days, 60
min after ingestion of either L-DOPA (150mg of L-DOPA and 37.5mg of
benserazide mixed in orange juice) or placebo (500 mg of ascorbic acid
Figure 1. Task design and performance on placebo and L-DOPA. A, In each of 300 trials, subjects made choices between safe and risky options. In 100 gain trials, the worst gamble outcomewas
zero. In 100 loss trials, the best gamble outcomewas zero. In 100mixed trials, bothgamble outcomegains and losseswere possible. Chosengambleswere resolved after a brief delay period. Subjects
were also asked after every 3–4 choice trials “how happy are you at this moment?” and indicated their responses by moving a slider. B, On average, subjects (n 30) gambledmost in gain trials,
less in mixed trials, and least in loss trials on both placebo and L-DOPA. Error bars indicate SEM. C, Subjects did not gamble more in mixed and loss trials on L-DOPA compared with placebo, but did
gamble more in gain trials. *p 0.05. D, Subjects who received higher effective drug doses chose more gain gambles on L-DOPA than placebo ( p 0.01).
9812 • J. Neurosci., July 8, 2015 • 35(27):9811–9822 Rutledge et al. • Dopaminergic Modulation of Choice and Emotion
mixed in orange juice). The testing order was randomized and counter-
balanced across subjects. Subjects were instructed not to eat for 2 h before
the study to achieve an equivalent level of drug absorption across indi-
viduals. Subjective mood ratings were recorded at initiation of the pro-
tocol, after drug/placebo administration, and at the start of the
experiment. Subjects were contacted 24 h after each session and asked to
report on a scale of 0–100 how happy they remembered being during the
session to evaluate possible drug effects on remembered happiness. Sub-
jects were not informed as to their precise cumulative earnings in either
session until 1 d after their final session, ensuring that remembered hap-
piness measures were not confounded by precise information about
earnings.
Experimental task. Stimuli were presented in MATLAB (MathWorks)
using Cogent 2000 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging). All sub-
jects performed a 300-trial economic decision-making task with trials of
three different types: gain trials,mixed trials, and loss trials. All trials were
independent and all values were explicit, obviating any learning. It is
important to note that preferences can differ in decision making from
description comparedwith decisionmaking from experience (Hertwig et
al., 2004). In 100 gain trials, subjects chose between a certain gain (30–55
pence) and a gamble with equal probabilities of £0 or a larger gain deter-
mined by a multiplier on the certain amount that varied from 1.6 to 4 to
accommodate a wide range of risk sensitivity, as in previous experiments
(Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Rutledge et al., 2014). In 100 loss trials,
subjects chose between a certain loss (30–55 pence) and a gamble with
equal probabilities of £0 or a larger loss determined by the same multi-
pliers as the gain trials. In 100mixed trials, subjects chose between £0 and
a gamble with equal probabilities of a gain (40–75 pence) or a loss deter-
mined by a multiplier on the gain amount that varied from 0.5–5 to
accommodate a wide range of loss sensitivity.
The proportions of gambling in each domain will depend on the exact
multipliers used to construct the design matrix. Because the same mul-
tipliers were used for gain and loss trials, including more small multipli-
ers should increase gambling in loss trials at the same time that it
decreases gambling in gain trials. The maximum gain or loss in a single
trial was £2.75. There was no time limit for choices. Unchosen options
disappeared after a choice and outcomes from chosen gambles were
revealed after a 2 s delay. Economic paradigms typically do not reveal the
outcome of every trial (Frydman et al., 2011; Symmonds et al., 2013) and
this may have important consequences for decision making in our task.
Each trial was followed by a 1 s intertrial interval. After every 3–4 trials,
subjects were asked “howhappy are you at thismoment?” andmade their
responses by moving a slider to indicate a point on a line. There was no
time limit to make these responses. The experiment started and ended
with a happiness question.
Behavioral analysis. Changes in the frequency of gambling and in
model parameters within placebo and L-DOPA sessions were not nor-
mally distributed (Shapiro–Wilk, p  0.05). Therefore, we used two-
tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to evaluate the significance of
differences and also used two-tailed Spearman’s correlations. For each
comparison involving data that passed tests of normality (Shapiro–Wilk,
p 0.05), we also performed analyses using paired t tests and Pearson’s
correlations. All findings reported as being significant at the 5% level
with nonparametric statistical tests remained so whenwe usedGaussian-
based tests.
To test for a value dependence of L-DOPA effects in gain trials, we split
the 100 gain trials according to the average objective return compared
with the safe option. In 70 high-value gain trials, gambling is advanta-
geous and the average return exceeds that of the safe alternative. In 30
low-value gain trials, the average return does not exceed that of the safe
alternative. Because the potential gains vary as a ratio of the certain gain,
this means that the potential gains, and therefore also the RPEs, are on
average larger for high- than low-value gain trials.
To test whether L-DOPA increased risk taking more in trials with
potential gains compared with trials with potential losses, we used a
permutation test, which is a nonparametric test that allows multiple
hypotheses to be tested simultaneously. In 10,000 random samples, we
randomly shuffled the condition (drug or placebo) for every subject and
computed the difference between the increase in gambling in gain trials
on L-DOPA compared with placebo and the increase in gambling for
mixed trials or loss trials. The permutation p-value is equal to the fraction
of samples for which the actual gambling-increase difference is not greater
than the resampled gambling-increase difference for gain trials compared
with either mixed trials or loss trials. Two comparisons were performed for
each resample, thus testing both hypotheses simultaneously.
Parametric decision model based on prospect theory. We fitted choice
behavior using an established parametric decisionmodel (Sokol-Hessner
et al., 2009) based on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
that describes choice behavior using four parameters. The subjective
values or expected utility of gambles and certain options were deter-
mined using the following equations:
Ugamble 0.5Vgain)
gain 0.5 Vloss
loss
Ucertain Vcertain)
gain if Vcertain 0
Ucertain Vcertain
loss if Vcertain 0
Where Vgain and Vloss are the values of the potential gain and loss from a
gamble, respectively, and Vcertain is the value of the certain option. Po-
tential losses in the gain trials were equal to zero (Vloss  0), as were
potential gains in the loss trials (Vgain 0). The degree of curvature in the
utility function in the gain domain is determined by gain and thus the
degree of risk aversion. An individual that is risk-neutral in gain trials has
gain  1 and would be indifferent between a certain gain and a gain
gamble with the same expected value. A risk-seeking subject would have
gain  1 and a risk-averse subject would have gain  1. The degree of
risk aversion in the loss domain is determined by loss. A risk-seeking
subject would haveloss 1 and a risk-averse subject would haveloss
1. The parameter  determines the degree of loss aversion. A gain-loss
neutral subject would have  1. A loss-averse subject would have 
1. A gain-seeking subject would have  1. We used the softmax rule to
determine the probability of selecting the gamble as follows:
Pgamble
1
1 e
	UgambleUcertain
Where the inverse temperature parameter 	 quantifies the degree of
stochasticity in choice behavior. We fitted parameters from both
L-DOPA and placebo sessions simultaneously with a shared inverse tem-
perature parameter in each individual. Parameters were constrained to
the range of parameters that could be identified based on our design
matrix (: 0.5–5, gain: 0.3–1.3, loss: 0.3–1.3).
We usedmodel comparison techniques (Schwarz, 1978; Burnham and
Anderson, 1998) to compare model fits. For each model fit in individual
subjects, we computed the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), which
penalizes for parameter number, and then summed BIC across subjects.
The model with the lowest BIC is the preferred model.
Parametric approach–avoidance decision model. We fitted choice be-
havior with an alternative parametric decision model that allowed for
value-independent tendencies to select or not select gambles. This had no
effect on the computation of subjective values for the risky or safe option.
Instead, we modified the softmax rule by which subjective values deter-
mine choice probabilities. We included separate parameters for gain tri-
als and loss trials. For gain trials, the probability of gambling depended
on 
gain as follows:
Pgamble
1 
gain
1 e
	UgambleUcertain
 
gain if 
gain 0
Pgamble
1 
gain
1 e
	UgambleUcertain
if 
gain 0
For loss trials, the probability of gambling depended on 
loss as follows:
Pgamble
1 
loss
1 e
	UgambleUcertain
 
loss if 
loss 0
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Pgamble
1 
loss
1 e
	UgambleUcertain
if 
loss 0
The softmax rule requires the function that relates subjective values and
choice probabilities to map subjective value differences to probabilities
from (0, 1). If either 
 parameter is positive, the function maps choice
probabilities in that domain from (
, 1). If either
 parameter is negative,
the function maps choice probabilities in that domain from (0, 1	
).
The parameter
 acts as a value-independent influence on the probability
of choosing the option with the largest potential gain or loss (always a
gamble in our design) that could be thought of as an approach–avoidance
bias term. This model differs substantially from prospect theory in being
discontinuous around the origin, such that the worst gain gamble can be
chosen a substantial fraction of the time and the best loss gamble can be
rejected a substantial fraction of the time.
Because mixed gambles included both potential gains and losses, we
did not apply bias parameters in those trials. To determine whether
including a 
 parameter for mixed trials would affect our main findings,
we fitted an additional model with a 
mixed parameter. For mixed trials,
the probability of gambling was determined in the same manner as for
the other two 
 parameters as follows:
Pgamble
1 
mixed
1 e
	UgambleUcertain
 
mixed if 
mixed  0
Pgamble
1 
mixed
1 e
	UgambleUcertain
if 
mixed  0
The present task design does not permit testing a more general form of
our proposal, which is that there may be valence-dependent, but value-
independent, tendencies to choose options with the largest potential gain
and avoid options with the largest potential loss.When two options, each
with one or more possible prizes, do not include potential losses, the
probability of choosing the option with the largest available reward (with
subjective value or expected utilityUlarge) instead of the alternative (with
subjective value or expected utilityUsmall, whereUsmall can be larger than
Ularge) is equal to:
P large
1
gain
1 e
	UlargeUsmall
 
gain if 
gain 0
P large
1
gain
1 e
	UlargeUsmall
if 
gain 0
It is a limitation of our present task design that the gamble always had the
largest potential gain in gain trials and these equations are therefore
equivalent to the notation we use above. Therefore, we cannot determine
whether any effects of L-DOPA will be specific for risky options or, as we
believe, options with the largest available reward. This more general
model (and the corresponding equations for trials with potential losses)
can be applied in situations in which the safe option has the largest
available reward or both options are risky and can have more than two
potential outcomes with different probabilities.
Dual-inverse-temperature decision model.We also fitted choice behav-
iorwith an alternate decisionmodel used in a previous study (Frydman et
al., 2011) that allowed for an asymmetric stochastic choice function with
separate inverse temperature parameters when the subjective value of the
gamble is higher or lower that the subjective value of the safe alternative.
This had no effect on the computation of option subjective values, which
were the same as in the prospect theory model. The probability of gam-
bling was determined by the following equations:
Pgamble
1
1 e
a	UgambleUcertain
if Ugamble Ucertain 0
Pgamble
1
1 e
aUgambleUcertain
if Ugamble Ucertain 0
Gain-loss learning model. To determine whether the outcome of pre-
vious gamble choices has an impact on subsequent choices, we fitted an
alternativemodel that allowed for the subjective value of a gain gamble to
be increased or decreased according to a gain-specific parameter depend-
ing on whether themost recently chosen gain gamble resulted in a win or
loss. It also included an equivalent parameter for loss trials. These param-
eters would capture influences of previous trials related to a learning
effect and allow testing for an effect of L-DOPA on that relationship. For
example, subjectsmight bemore likely to gamble in a gain trial after awin
from a gain gamble. The subjective values or expected utility of gambles
were determined using the following equations:
Ugamble 0.5Vgain)
gain0.5Vloss
loss gain Ogain
previous if Vloss 0
Ugamble 0.5Vgain)
gain0.5Vloss
loss loss Oloss
previous if Vgain 0
The variable Ogain
previous was equal to 1 if the most recently chosen gain
gamble resulted in a win and 1 if a loss. The variable Oloss
previous was
similarly equal to 1 or1 depending on the outcome of themost recently
chosen loss gamble.
Happiness computational models. We modeled momentary happiness
using a model (Rutledge et al., 2014) that includes terms for certain
rewards (CR, in £), gamble expected values (EV, average of the two
possible outcomes), and RPEs (the difference between the gamble out-
come and gamble EV). According to the model, happiness ratings are as
follows:
Happinesst w0  w1
j1
t
tjCRj w2
j1
t
tjEVj  w3
j1
t
tjRPEj
Where t is trial number, w0 is a constant term, and other weights w
capture the influence of different event types. These influences are as-
sumed to decay exponentially over time with a forgetting factor 0
1 that renders recent eventsmore influential than earlier events. CRj is the
certain reward if chosen instead of a gamble on trial j, EVj is the expected
value of a gamble (average reward for the gamble) if chosen on trial j, and
RPEj is the RPE on trial j contingent on choice of the gamble. Terms for
unchosen options were set to zero.
Because some studies have suggested that dopamine might differen-
tially represent positive and negative RPEs, we fitted a secondmodel that
separates RPEs into positive and negative terms and weights w3 and w4
capture their distinct influences as follows:
Happinesst w0  w1
j1
t
tjCRj w2
j1
t
tjEVj
 w3
j1
t
tjposRPEj w4
j1
t
tjnegRPEj
Because some subjects rarely gambled in the low-value gain trials, we
included in non-model-based analyses the 21 subjects who experienced
at least two gamble wins and two gamble losses from low-value gain trials
in placebo and L-DOPA sessions.
Results
Overall earnings did not differ between placebo (£33.40  7.65,
mean  SD) and L-DOPA sessions (£35.94  6.47, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, Z  1.31, p  0.19). Because subjects were
presented with each set of options twice in a randomized order in
each experimental session, we could assess consistency of prefer-
ences while avoiding confounds related to learning.We observed
that subjects made the same choice when presented with each set
of options on 82.8 9.6% of trials on placebo and 84.1 8.1%
on L-DOPA (Z  0.99, p  0.32), indicating similar degrees of
consistency across conditions.
The percentages of gambles chosen in placebo and L-DOPA
sessions were similar in mixed (Z  1.33, p  0.18) and loss
trials (Z  0.83, p  0.41). However, in gain trials, subjects
chosemore gambles under L-DOPA comparedwith placebo (Z
2.07, p 0.04; Fig. 1). Using a permutation test allowingmultiple
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hypotheses to be tested simultaneously, we found that L-DOPA
increased the number of risky options chosen more in trials with
only potential gains compared with trials with potential losses
(p  0.02). We also found a significant effect of drug dosage
(which varied between 1.6 and 3.2 mg/kg according to body
weight). Subjects with larger effective doses showed a greater in-
crease in the number of risky options chosen in gain trials on
L-DOPA compared with placebo (Spearman’s  0.47, p 0.01;
Fig. 1D), a relationship also present in females alone (Spearman’s
 0.67, p 0.01), suggesting that the effect is related to dosage
and not sex. To test for a value depen-
dence of L-DOPA effects, we split the trials
according to average objective return into
high-value (gambling is advantageous)
and low-value (gambling is disadvanta-
geous) trials. Subjects gambled more on
L-DOPA than placebo in low-value trials
(Z 2.15, p 0.03), but the increase was
not significant in high-value trials alone
(Z 1.43, p 0.15).
Parametric decisionmodel based on
prospect theory
Prospect theory offers a canonical account
of decision making under risk (Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1979). Therefore, we
first considered whether the effect of
L-DOPA could be characterized by a
change in prospect theory model parame-
ters (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992;
Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). This identifies
four quantities, namely the weighting of
losses relative to equivalent gains (loss
aversion, ), risk aversion in the gain do-
main (gain), risk aversion in the loss do-
main (loss), and stochasticity in choice
(inverse temperature, 	). By design, the
options presented allow these parameters
to be estimated over a wide range of
values.
Generally, the parametric prospect
theory model offered a good account of
subject choices under placebo and
L-DOPA (Fig. 2A). On average, the model
fit choice data with a pseudo-r2 0.51
0.19 (mean SD), with a similar low de-
gree of loss aversion to previous results using a similar design in
which every trial counts (see Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009 for a
discussion of loss aversion in previous studies). Parameter esti-
mates were correlated across placebo and L-DOPA sessions (all
parameters, Spearman’s  0.6, p 0.001), suggesting that our
paradigm allows measurement of stable differences in choice
preferences between subjects. However, there was no difference
in gain between placebo and L-DOPA sessions (Z  0.96, p 
0.34; Fig. 2B) despite a clear change in behavior. To examine this
further, we plotted the propensity to gamble for each decile of
gamble value (indexed as the ratio of the gamble gain amount to
the certain gain amount; Fig. 2C). The decision model based on
prospect theory is notably unable to account for key effects evi-
dent in the data (Fig. 2D).
Parametric approach–avoidance decision model
In prospect theory, the propensity to choose risky options de-
pends on the value of available options. However, the data shown
in Figure 2C suggest that the L-DOPA effect in gain trials is inde-
pendent of value: subjects choosemore risky options on L-DOPA
for all gamble value levels. We therefore developed a model that
allows for value-independent influences, thought of in terms of
approach or avoidance, in addition to the value-dependent influ-
ences captured by parametric models based on prospect theory.
Given the link between dopamine and appetitive processing, we
allowed for the possibility that this effect would depend on va-
lence. Therefore, we included parameters 
gain for gain trials and
Figure 2. Choice behavior and economic decision model fits. A, Parametric model based on prospect theory explained choice
behavior. Error bars indicate SEM. B, Parameter estimates were similar on placebo and L-DOPA. C, Gain gamble value was deter-
mined relative to the value of the certain option. Deciles 1–2 corresponded to lower expected reward for the gamble than the
certain option. Decile 3 corresponded to equal expected reward for the gamble and certain option. Deciles 4–10 corresponded to
higher expected reward for the gamble than the certain option. As gain gamble value increased, subjects gambled more on both
placebo and L-DOPA, as expected.D, Averagemodel fit across subjects for the prospect theorymodel, which cannot account for the
observed difference in choice behavior on L-DOPA compared with placebo.
Table 1. Decisionmodel comparison results
Model
Parameters
per subject Mean r 2 Median r 2 Model BIC BIC- BICa-a
Prospect theory 7 0.51 0.50 13620 883
Approach–avoidance 11 0.57 0.58 12737 0
Dual-inverse-temperature 10 0.54 0.52 13363 626
Gain-loss learning 11 0.52 0.51 14160 1423
Approach–avoidance-mixed 13 0.60 0.59 12596 141
BIC measures are summed across the 30 subjects. Parameters per subject are across both placebo and L-DOPA
sessions. All models include separate parameters for placebo and L-DOPA sessions that capture the weighting of
losses relative to equivalent gains (loss aversion,), risk aversion in thegaindomain (gain ), and risk aversion in the
loss domain (loss ). All models except the dual-inverse-temperature model included a shared parameter across
sessions for stochasticity in choice (inverse temperature,	). The final column is the difference between the model
BIC and BICa-a, the BIC for the approach–avoidance model. The approach–avoidance model was preferred (lower
BIC) to the prospect theory model, dual-inverse-temperature model, and gain-loss learningmodel. Themore com-
plex approach-avoidance-mixed model included additional approach–avoidance parameters for the mixed trials
and had the lowest BIC of the models tested.
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loss for loss trials and performed model
comparison to verify that the additional
model complexity compared with the
parametric prospect theory model was
justified. Positive or negative values of
these parameters correspond respectively
to an increased or decreased probability of
gambling without regard to the value of
the gamble. Strikingly, the parameter
gain
was positive in both placebo and L-DOPA
sessions (both Z 2.2, p 0.05) and the
parameter 
loss was negative in both ses-
sions (both Z2.2, p 0.05). Our new
model was preferred by Bayesian model
comparison with the benchmark para-
metric prospect theory model, an alterna-
tive decisionmodel (Frydman et al., 2011)
and a model that allowed for, but failed to
find, an effect of previous outcomes on
choice (Table 1).
We found that 
gain was significantly
greater under L-DOPA than placebo (Z
2.14, p  0.03; Fig. 3). In comparison,
there was no difference in , gain, and
loss between placebo and L-DOPA ses-
sions (all Z 1, p 0.3). Parameter es-
timateswere correlated across sessions (all
parameters, Spearman’s   0.5, p 
0.01). Furthermore, the predictions of this
model qualitatively captured the increase
in gain gambling on L-DOPA across gam-
ble value levels (Fig. 3A). Consistent with
a causal effect, subjects who received
higher effective doses had a greater in-
crease in 
gain (Spearman’s  0.42, p
0.02; Fig. 3D). As expected, dose and
change in gain were uncorrelated (Spearman’s   0.13, p 
0.49). The change in the number of gain gambles chosen on
L-DOPA and placebo was highly correlated with the change in

gain (Spearman’s   0.87, p  0.001), but not the change in
gain (Spearman’s   0.27, p  0.15). There was no difference
in 
loss between sessions (Z1.03, p 0.30).
Because the gambles in mixed trials include both potential
gains and losses, these trials were not allocated to either 
gain or

loss. The data suggest that the best mixed gambles are usually
chosen and the worst mixed gambles rarely chosen (Fig. 4), con-
sistent with there being little approach or avoidance influence on
those trials in our task. To determine whether including a 
 pa-
rameter for mixed trials would affect ourmain findings, we fitted
an additional model that included a 
mixed parameter. This
model actually fit best overall; however, importantly, 
gain was
again greater under L-DOPA (
gain: Z  2.01, p  0.04) and
subjects who received higher effective doses had a greater increase
in 
gain on L-DOPA (Spearman’s  0.37, p 0.045). There was
no difference between 
mixed on L-DOPA and placebo (Z 
0.11, p 0.91), parameters that were positive in both sessions
(placebo: Z 2.21, p 0.03; L-DOPA: Z 1.84, p 0.07).
We tested two additional decisionmodels (Table 1). The dual-
inverse-temperaturemodel (Frydman et al., 2011) allowed for an
asymmetric stochastic choice functionwith separate inverse tem-
perature parameters when the subjective value of the gamble is
higher or lower that the subjective value of the certain alternative.
There was no difference between sessions for the inverse temper-
ature parameter when the gamble subjective value was higher
than the certain alternative (a	: placebo, 0.88; L-DOPA, 0.74;Z
0.92, p 0.36) or when the gamble subjective value was lower
(a: placebo, 0.74; L-DOPA, 0.66; Z  0.48, p  0.63). There
was no relationship between the change in a	 in L-DOPA com-
paredwith placebo sessions and effective dosage (Spearman’s 
0.10, p 0.61).
We also tested a decision model that tested for an effect of
previous outcomes on choice. There was no difference between
placebo and L-DOPA sessions for the parameter for gain trials
(gain: placebo, 0.15; L-DOPA, 0.19; Z  0.83, p  0.41) or the
parameter for loss trials (loss: placebo, 0.01; L-DOPA,0.07;Z
0.57, p 0.57). There was also no relationship between effec-
tive dosage and the increase in gain on L-DOPA compared with
placebo (Spearman’s   0.14, p  0.45). To further test for
possible learning effects, we also examined the frequency with
which subjects chose to gamble depending on the outcome of
previously chosen gambles. Subjects were similarly likely to gam-
ble when the most recently chosen gamble resulted in a win or
loss (placebo, 50.7% after win, 51.0% after loss; L-DOPA, 51.0%
after win, 51.0% after loss). Subjects were also similarly likely to
gamble when the mostly recently chosen gamble in the same
domain resulted in a win or a loss (placebo, 51.1% after win,
52.4% after loss; L-DOPA, 53.8% after win, 52.4% after loss). In
both cases, the probability of gambling after a winwas not greater
on L-DOPA than placebo (both Z 1, p 0.3).
Figure 3. Approach–avoidance model fits. A, Our approach–avoidance model incorporates an additional value-independent,
valence-dependent effect on choice probability that accounts for the increased gambling on L-DOPA across gamble value deciles.
B, Risk aversion parametersgain andloss for both placebo and L-DOPA sessions were1, indicating risk aversion in the gain
domain and risk seeking in the loss domain. Approach–avoidance parameter 
gain was positive (“approach”) and 
loss was
negative (“avoid”) inplaceboand L-DOPAsessions. Error bars indicate SEM.*p0.05.C,
gainwashigher on L-DOPA thanplacebo,
indicating an increased tendency to choose gain gambles independent of value. D, Subjects that received higher effective drug
doses had a greater increase in
gain on L-DOPA than placebo ( p 0.05).
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Dopamine and subjective emotional state
Wemeasured subjective feelings over various time scales, finding
no difference on average between placebo and L-DOPA sessions
in ratings or the SD of ratings (Fig. 5). We note that the latter
measure was highly correlated across placebo and L-DOPA ses-
sions (Spearman’s  0.79, p 0.001), suggesting that it repre-
sents a stable trait in individuals. Three other model-free
measures also failed to capture an effect of L-DOPA. First, sub-
jective feeling reports on 16 dimensions before and after the task
did not show any difference between L-DOPA and placebo ses-
sions (Table 2). Second, after each session, subjects rated their
overall feelings about the task on 12 dimensions using the day
reconstruction method (Kahneman et al., 2004). Positive and
negative affect scores computed from these responses did not
differ between sessions (average positive affect: 3.2 for placebo,
3.0 for L-DOPA; average negative affect: 2.0 for placebo, 2.1 for
L-DOPA; both Z 1, p 0.3). Finally, we contacted subjects
the day after each session, but before they knew their earnings
from the experiment, and asked them how happy they remem-
bered being during the task. Their remembered states of hap-
piness did not differ between sessions (Z  0.26, p  0.79;
Fig. 5).
We used our recently developed model that parameterizes
how ratings of momentary happiness relate to past rewards and
expectations (Rutledge et al., 2014). Note that quantities in the
model are linked to phasic dopamine release (Schultz et al.,
1997), providing a substrate for an interaction with the drug.
Parameters were fit to happiness ratings in individual subjects
(Fig. 6). CR, EV, and RPE weights were, on average, positive in
both sessions (all Z  3.3, p  0.001; Fig. 6C), with EV weights
lower than RPE weights in both placebo and L-DOPA sessions
(both Z  3.8, p  0.001), replicating previous results (Rut-
ledge et al., 2014). There was no significant difference in CR, EV,
or RPE weights between placebo and L-DOPA sessions (all Z
1, p  0.3). The forgetting factor also did not differ between
sessions (placebo: 0.79 0.24; L-DOPA: 0.71 0.32; Z0.87,
p 0.38). One obvious complicating factor is the possibility that
the release and impact of dopamine after positive and negative
prediction errors may be asymmetric (Frank et al., 2004; Bayer
and Glimcher, 2005; Rutledge et al., 2009; Cockburn et al., 2014).
We therefore split the RPE term into separate terms for positive
and negative RPEs.Weights were lower for positive than negative
RPEs, althoughnot significantly so in either session (placebo:Z
1.66, p  0.10; L-DOPA: Z  1.18, p  0.24; Fig. 6D). The
model with a single RPE term was preferred by Bayesian model
comparison (lower BIC) for both sessions (placebo: BIC 
13,163 versus 13,085; L-DOPA: BIC  12,275 versus
12,251). There was no difference for either parameter between
sessions (both Z 1, p 0.3). Therefore, we found no support
for the hypothesis that L-DOPA affects happiness by modulating
all positive RPEs.
As with the failure of the parametric prospect theorymodel to
capture the effect of L-DOPA on risk taking, the happiness model
failed to capture any effect of L-DOPA on happiness ratings. We
tested an additional hypothesis that L-DOPAmight influence the
subset of trials with potential gains but not potential losses (Pes-
Figure 4. Choice behavior and approach–avoidance model fits for mixed and loss trials. A, Mixed gamble value was determined by the ratio of the potential gain to the potential loss. As mixed
gamble value increased, subjects gambledmore, as expected.B, Averagemodel fit across subjects for the approach–avoidancemodel. C, Subjects who received higher effective doses did not have
a larger change in the number of mixed gambles chosen on L-DOPA than placebo (Spearman’s  0.02, p 0.91), a relationship that would be negative if L-DOPA decreased risk taking. D, Loss
gamble value was determined relative to the value of the certain option. As loss gamble value increased, subjects gambled more, as expected. E, Average model fit across subjects for the
approach–avoidance model, which can account for the low probability of gambling for even the highest gamble values in placebo and L-DOPA sessions. F, Subjects who received higher effective
doses did not have a larger change in the number of loss gambles chosen on L-DOPA than placebo (Spearman’s 0.19, p 0.32), a relationship that would be negative if L-DOPA decreased risk
taking.
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siglione et al., 2006; Schmidt et al., 2014), a hypothesis also mo-
tivated by our finding that the influence of L-DOPAon choicewas
confined to gain trials. We considered gain trials based upon a
split into high- and low-value gain gambles, as described previ-
ously. As expected, subjects were happier after gamble wins than
losses for both high- and low-value gamble trials on both placebo
and L-DOPA (all Z  2.3, p  0.05; Fig. 6). In placebo sessions,
happiness was greater after the larger rewards in high- compared
with low-value gamble wins (Z  3.70, p  0.001). In contrast,
happiness did not differ after wins from high- and low-value
gambles on L-DOPA (Z  0.33, p  0.74). Despite equivalent
objective rewards, subjects were happier after winning the small
rewards from low-value gambles while on L-DOPA than they
were after winning those same rewards while on placebo (Z 
2.17, p  0.03; Fig. 6E). That is, for the same actions and same
rewards, happiness was higher on L-DOPA than placebo with the
interaction between drug condition and value being significant
(two-way ANOVA, p  0.03). Happiness after losses from low-
value gambles was unaffected (Z 0.54, p 0.59). One explana-
tion for our results is that on L-DOPA all reward magnitudes are
associated with similar dopamine release and therefore similar
resulting happiness. Consistent with this idea, we used a Spear-
man correlation to determine the strength of relationships be-
tween happiness and gamble value decile in each subject and
found lower reward discriminability on L-DOPA compared with
placebo (Z2.33, p 0.02).
Figure 5. Happiness ratings across sessions. A, L-DOPA did not affect the mean or SD of happiness ratings. Error bars indicate SEM. B, Mean happiness ratings were uncorrelated across
placebo and L-DOPA sessions ( p 0.27). C, SD of happiness ratings was correlated across placebo and L-DOPA sessions ( p 0.001). D, L-DOPA did not affect initial or final happiness
ratings or how happy subjects remembered being the day after the session (all p 0.2). Error bars indicate SEM. E, Mean happiness ratings were correlated with how happy subjects
remembered being the day after the session (both Spearman’s  0.5, p 0.01). F, Remembered happiness was uncorrelated between placebo and L-DOPA sessions (Spearman’s 
0.21, p 0.27).
Table 2. Subjective state questionnaire results
Subjective state questionnaire
Placebo
start
L-DOPA
start p-value
Placebo
end
L-DOPA
end p-value
Alert to drowsy 0.18 1.20 0.15 0.12 0.82 0.62
Calm to excited 0.29 0.22 0.42 0.36 0.06 0.72
Strong to feeble 0.17 0.68 0.06 0.06 0.51 0.96
Muzzy to clear headed 0.04 0.94 0.12 0.60 1.12 0.86
Coordinated to clumsy 0.75 0.25 0.11 0.34 0.33 0.78
Lethargic to energetic 0.15 0.67 0.19 0.17 0.91 0.21
Contented to discontented 0.05 0.65 0.20 0.40 0.51 0.85
Troubled to tranquil 0.23 0.05 0.70 0.71 0.32 0.62
Slow to quick witted 0.05 0.64 0.04 0.44 0.68 0.40
Tense to relaxed 0.04 0.54 0.22 0.74 0.93 0.44
Attentive to dreamy 0.11 0.83 0.14 0.01 0.94 0.09
Incompetent to proficient 0.26 0.32 0.67 0.48 0.71 0.95
Happy to sad 0.08 0.06 0.87 0.28 0.16 0.62
Antagonistic to friendly 0.09 0.24 0.95 0.64 1.04 0.26
Interested to bored 0.14 0.40 0.53 0.52 0.64 1.00
Withdrawn to sociable 0.52 0.41 0.75 0.06 0.02 0.88
Scores represent differences in ratings in a subjective state questionnaire between baseline (before placebo or
L-DOPA administration) and the start of the task or the end of the task. Questionswere answered bymarking a point
on a line and responseswere converted to a 0–10 scale.Weused aWilcoxon signed-rank test and thep-values listed
are not corrected for multiple comparisons. We found no evidence for an overall effect of L-DOPA on any subjective
state report because no testwould survive any correction formultiple comparisons. However,many such corrections
might be considered too conservative. For three variables, we identified trends at the 10% significance level (un-
corrected) for a difference in subjective ratings between placebo and L-DOPA. For those three cases, we then tested
for a dose-dependent relationship between L-DOPA and the size of the change in subjective responses because
heavier subjects may not be affected and lighter subjects would be. We found no evidence for a relationship at the
10% significance level for these three tests, and therefore found no evidence supporting a dose-dependent effect of
L-DOPA on these subjective state reports.
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Discussion
We investigated the role of dopamine in value-based decision
making by considering both choices and the subjective feelings
elicited by rewards resulting from those choices. Boosting dopa-
mine levels pharmacologically using L-DOPA dose-dependently
increased the number of gambles chosen
in trials with potential gains, but not in
trials in which losses were possible. Fur-
thermore, self-reports of subjective well-
being were explained by the recent history
of expectations and RPEs resulting from
those expectations, as we showed previ-
ously (Rutledge et al., 2014). L-DOPA
boosted the increase in happiness that fol-
lowed small rewards, outcomes that on
placebo increased happiness by only a
small amount.
It is natural to consider the effects as
relating to an influence of L-DOPA on
phasic dopamine release (Pessiglione et
al., 2006), which is associated with RPEs
(Schultz et al., 1997). The same specificity
for gain over loss trials has been observed
in contexts in which phasic dopamine is
associated with learning (Pessiglione et
al., 2006; Schmidt et al., 2014), although
our task was designed to obviate learning
to allow testing of other roles for dopa-
mine. That L-DOPA effects are specific to
gain trials (and not also to mixed trials)
suggests that RPEs associated with the
trial type may be critical for the effect; in
this task design, even the worst gain trial is
better than the average trial and so likely
inspires dopamine release. Our model
proposes that L-DOPA amplifies ap-
proach toward potential gains but does
not affect avoidance of potential losses.
We had no prediction as to how approach
and avoidance influences would combine
when options are associatedwith both po-
tential gains and losses, as in the mixed
trials. Our results suggest that these influ-
ences do not combine linearly and that the
presence of a potential loss negates any
tendency to approachmixed gambles that
might be amplified under L-DOPA. Our
results do not support a proposal that
modulating dopaminergic transmission
should affect loss aversion (Clark and
Dagher, 2014), although it is possible that
another drug that affects the valuation
processmight increase gambling inmixed
trials.
One possible interpretation of the
valence-dependent but value-indepen-
dent terms in the model is that they
represent forms of Pavlovian approach
(Dayan et al., 2006; Bushong et al., 2010)
and withdrawal (Huys et al., 2011;Wright
et al., 2012) in the face of gains and losses,
respectively. Such Pavlovian actions are
elicitedwithout regard to their actual con-
tingent benefits. The modulation of 
gain by L-DOPA is consis-
tent with an association between dopaminergic RPEs and
incentive salience (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; McClure et al.,
2003), which can, in principle, provide an account of dopaminer-
gic drug effects on pathological gambling and impulsive behavior
Figure 6. Rewards and expectations explain momentary subjective well-being. A, B, Happiness ratings and cumulative task
earnings across subjects (n 30) on placebo (A) and L-DOPA (B) (placebo: r 2 0.49 0.25; L-DOPA: r 2 0.45 0.25).
Happinessmodel fits are displayed for themodel in C. Subjects completed 300 choice trials andmade a rating after every 3–4 trials
for a total of 90 ratings. C, The computational model that best explained momentary happiness had positive weights for certain
rewards, gamble EVs, and gamble RPEs. Error bars indicate SEM.D, An alternative computationalmodel included separate positive
and negative RPE terms. E, F, In trials with potential gains but not losses, happiness was higher after gamble wins than losses on
both placebo and L-DOPA (both p 0.05). Happiness was higher after the small rewards from low-value gain gambles on L-DOPA
compared with placebo (E), but not for the large rewards from high-value gain gambles (F ). Error bars indicate SEM. *p 0.05.
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in humans (Molina et al., 2000; Cools et al., 2003) and rodents (St
Onge and Floresco, 2009; Stopper et al., 2014). Under this Pav-
lovian interpretation, one might have expected 
gain and 
loss to
depend on some aspect of gamble value. Our design was not
optimized to investigate this possibility. Our model should gen-
eralize to noneconomic tasks such as instrumental learning par-
adigms, where we would predict that boosting dopamine should
increase approach toward the option associated with the largest
available reward even if the expected value of that option is lower
than alternative options.
Our approach–avoidance model accounted for effects of
L-DOPA that eluded prospect theory. Our model also outper-
formed a model with multiple inverse temperature parameters
used to explain choice in MAOA-L carriers (Frydman et al.,
2011). BecauseMAOA is an enzyme involved in prefrontal dopa-
mine catabolism, it may be that the two studies identify distinct
contributors to choice that both relate to dopamine, neither of
which is easily explained by changes to the utility function. That
our effect is Pavlovian might also account for the absence of an
influence of a lower dose of L-DOPA in a previous study (Sym-
monds et al., 2013) that involved a mandatory 5 s waiting period
before decisions, which might reduce the impact of cue-evoked
dopamine release on Pavlovian approach.
Neural activitymeasured in ventral striatum andmedial fron-
tal cortex, areas innervated by dopamine afferents, is reported to
correlate with the magnitude of potential gains and losses (Tom
et al., 2007). Electrophysiological recording experiments report
neuronal populations in the medial frontal cortex that represent
appetitive and aversive stimuli (Amemori and Graybiel, 2012;
Monosov and Hikosaka, 2012). How these and other areas con-
tribute to choice is the subject of intense ongoing investigation
(for review, see Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Bissonette et al., 2014).
Dopamine neurons have been suggested to be insensitive to the
aversiveness of a stimulus (Fiorillo, 2013), an observation consis-
tent with our finding that boosting dopamine does not affect
decisions with potential losses. Our results suggest that ap-
proach–avoidance influences play an important role in choice,
adding to our growing quantitative understanding of dopami-
nergic contributions to asymmetries in learning (Piray et al.,
2014) and choice (Collins and Frank, 2014).
The incentive saliencemodel also permits choice asymmetries
unrelated to learning (Zhang et al., 2009), but does not predict, as
our model does, that L-DOPA will increase choice to risky op-
tions that have a larger potential reward but a lower expected
value than the safe alternative. In the opponent actor learning
model, an agent learns separate weights for how good and how
bad an option is (Collins and Frank, 2014), corresponding to the
D1-direct andD2-indirect striatal pathways, respectively, consis-
tent with effects of optogenetic stimulation of D1 and D2
receptor-expressing striatal projection neurons on learning
(Kravitz et al., 2012) and choice (Tai et al., 2012). In this model,
dopaminergicdrugs can,during choice, boostD1weights represent-
ing how good options are. Although the opponent actor learning
model focuses on experienced-based decisions, that model could in
principle be adapted based on the results presented here to account
for the increase in risk taking that we observe in gain trials. Our
results suggest that L-DOPA increasesdopamine releaseduring trials
with potential gains but not losses. This finding is consistent with
L-DOPA increasingD1 activity in gain trials and in this way enhanc-
ing the probability of risky choice, but not similarly increasing D1
activity during trials with potential losses.
The role of dopamine in happiness remains controversial. Do-
pamine drugs do not affect the hedonic “liking” responses that
animals make in response to sucrose reward (although opioid
drugs do; see Smith et al., 2011; Castro and Berridge, 2014).
Equally, L-DOPA does not affect overall mood (Liggins et al.,
2012). However, L-DOPA can increase the expected pleasure of
imagined future rewards (Sharot et al., 2009). The relationship is
not firmly established between the happiness that we character-
ize, with its sensitivity to secondary reinforcers such as money,
and the “liking” evident in low-levelmotor actions such as appet-
itive gapes that is sensitive to primary reinforcers such as food.
In our task, we would predict a role for dopamine in momen-
tary happiness from the observation that this subjective state is
explained by the recent history of RPEs (Rutledge et al., 2014), a
finding replicated here. We would predict a specific influence in
gain trials based on the inference from the L-DOPA effect on
choice that the drug modulated RPEs in gain trials. We indeed
found such an influence. Notably, the L-DOPA effect was present
for the smaller rewards received from low-value gain gambles,
but not the larger rewards received fromhigh-value gain gambles,
suggesting that there may be a ceiling effect that future research
could examine. The observation that subjects experienced in-
creased happiness after small rewards suggests that their in-
creased willingness to take these apparently deleterious risks
might actually have maximized their expected happiness. Unfor-
tunately, the small number of low-value gain gamble wins pre-
cluded the development of an alternative happiness model that
parameterizes a role for dopamine, but such amodel is an impor-
tant goal. Previous studies that involved learning have suggested
that dopamine drugs boost the effects of RPEs on subsequent
choice (Pessiglione et al., 2006; Schmidt et al., 2014). Our finding
that L-DOPA boosts the effects of rewards on happiness is con-
sistent with that result.
In summary, our findings suggest that dopamine plays a role
in both decision making under uncertainty and the subjective
feelings of happiness related to receipt of reward. These results
are consistent with L-DOPA modulating positive prediction er-
rors both at the time of option and outcome presentation when
there are potential gains but not losses, affecting both the proba-
bility of a gamble decision and the subjective feelings that accrue
from receipt of rewards. We note that anhedonia (reduced plea-
sure in response to the occurrence of rewarding events) is amajor
symptom of depression and that a link between dopamine and
depression has been suggested (Nestler and Carlezon, 2006;
Lemos et al., 2012; Tye et al., 2013). Our finding of a specific
causal link between dopamine and subjective feelings suggests
potential therapeutic approaches for mood disorders.
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